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TESTING VICKERY’S REVENUE EQUIVALENCE 
THEORY IN CONSTRUCTION AUCTIONS 
 
Abstract  
 
Construction work is often allocated to contractors via first price sealed bid auctions. 
American Nobel Prize winner and Economist William Vickery, however, has suggested 
that a second price auction (lowest bidder wins the contract at the second lowest price) 
may be more beneficial to those concerned due to the revenue equivalence theory (RET).  
This implies that, upon certain conditions being met, owners can, in the long run, expect 
to pay approximately the same amount to contractors irrespective of whether contracts 
are awarded according to a first price auction (FPA) or second price auction (SPA). At 
the same time, it is expected to be easier to bid in a SPA.  
 
In the absence of any real world data, the likely effects of using SPA for construction 
were examined experimentally.  This involved the participation of a group of experienced 
construction bidders over 60 identical first and second price construction auctions.  
Contrary to expectations, the bids for the second price arrangement were significantly 
higher, indicating that RET is unlikely to occur in practice in construction bidding. In 
other words, the results indicate that construction clients are likely to pay more if second 
price auctioning is used in the construction industry. 
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Introduction 
 
The best strategy in a first price sealed low bid auction (FPA) (where the bidder 
submitting the lowest bid wins the contract at the value of the lowest bid) is for 
contractors to (1) assume theirs is the lowest bid, (2) determine their bid and (3) then 
adjust the bid upwards to the second lowest bid (Ramusen 1996). However, for 
construction contract auctions, the “compactness” of the bids (Dyer and Kagel 1996) 
makes it virtually impossible to estimate the value of the second lowest bid with 
sufficient accuracy and the problem facing contractors is that increasing their bid too 
little results in lost revenue to the contractor while increasing too much means losing the 
competition.  
 
The second price sealed bid auction (SPA), or Vickery (1961) auction as it is sometimes 
known, attempts to overcome this difficulty by awarding the contract to the lowest bidder 
at the second lowest bid price. Upon certain conditions being met, Vickery has shown  
that contract sellers (i.e. clients) can, in the long run, expect to pay the same amount to 
contract buyers (i.e. contractors) irrespective of whether contracts are awarded to the 
lowest bidder at the lowest bid price or to the lowest bidder at the second lowest bid 
price. This is referred to in auction literature as the revenue equivalence theory. This 
implies that construction clients and contractors would be no worse off financially 
irrespective of whether a FPA or SPA is used.  There is likely to be a psychological 
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difference, however, with contractors feeling they are getting a better deal.  One outcome 
of this could be that contractors will be happier with their lot and less inclined to seek 
ways of extracting more money out of clients by cutting corners and/or claiming extras.  
In other words, a less disputatious industry may result – solving, at a stroke, what has 
been recognised over the years as the biggest problem facing the construction industry 
world-wide (e.g. Simon, 1944; Banwell, 1964; Latham, 1994, in the United Kingdom ;  
Business Round Table, 1994 in the USA and Gyles, 1992 in Australia  ). 
 
Apart from introducing the revenue equivalence theory Vickery argued that using SPA 
would force bidders to be more truthful. This is because the dominant strategy in Vickery 
auctions is for bidders to bid without need to make competition adjustments (i.e. (1) 
assume theirs is the lowest bid and (2) determine their bid only).  Hypothetical examples 
can be used to explain this phenomenon. Suppose a contractor is bidding in four separate 
competitions where the cost estimate for each competition happens to be exactly $10 
million, the minimum mark up margin (including profit) is 10%. The contractor’s private 
valuation becomes $11 million.  A Vickery auction is used. Suppose the lowest rival bid 
in each of the four competitions is $10.6, $10.9, $11.3 and $11.8 million respectively. 
Table 1 shows that if the contractor submits a bid of $11 million the additional profit 
amounts to $1.1 million. If, however, the contractor submits a more competitive bid of 
$10.8 million it can be seen that the profit actually reduces by $100,000 to $1.0 million 
and if the contractor decides to increase its bid to $11.6 million the profit reduces further 
to $0.8million. Therefore the best strategy, in the long run, is for contractors to simply 
determine their bid without having to make the difficult upwards adjustment. 
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Despite the theoretical advantages of being simpler to bid and 
producing truthful bidding competitions TESTING 
VICKERY’S REVENUE EQUIVALENCE THEORY IN 
CONSTRUCTION AUCTIONS 
 
, Vickery auctions are rare.  Rothkopf et al (1990) have suggested two reasons for this. 
First, bidders have a natural reluctatnce to follow the truth revealing strategies just 
described, especially in competitions requiring subsequent negotiations. Second, Vickery 
auctions are not so robust with respect to cheating and the fear of cheating. Apart from 
collusion taking place, which adversely affects all types of auction designs, it is feared 
that some bidders may deliberately bid low to win the competition unfairly. Are 
contractors willing to take such risks in construction, especially on the larger contracts 
which involve huge sums of money? Although contractors may occasionally have some 
degree of success by deliberately bidding low, clearly this is a risky strategy. If more than 
one contractor deliberately bids low then the lowest bidder is likely to end up in financial 
ruin. It would therefore not be unreasonable to assume that, at least for the vast majority 
of contracts, the possibility of more than one contractor deliberately doing this should 
deter all the other contractors from deliberately bidding low. If this assumption is 
accepted, another key consideration is whether construction clients are likely to pay the 
same irrespective of using FPA or SPA. In other words, Does Vickery’s  revenue 
equivalence theory hold? 
 
Bidding experiments in construction 
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The construction bidding process has been simulated in the classroom. For example, 
Lansley (1999) and Harris and McCaffer (1989) have developed software for contractor 
management games. Tthe main purpose of these games, however, is to simulate the 
running of a construction firm as a whole rather than to specifically focus on the bidding 
process and are therefore unable to compare alternative construction bidding designs.  
 
Although these games do have the potential to generate the data needed, so many other 
variables would need to be considered that it would have taken the participants an 
unreasonably long time to bid for 60 first price auctions and second price auctions (the 
number of auctions needed to generate a reasonable data set). Also a classroom 
environment means that participants would have very little time to think about what bid 
level to submit. It was therefore decided to simplify the game format by focusing on a 
methodology that tests applicability of Vickery’s revenue equivalence theory to 
construction auctions by directly comparing FPA and SPA results. 
 
Bidding experiment methodology 
 
Six professionals, with at least 15 years experience of organising and participating in 
bidding competitions in the Hong Kong construction industry, were invited to participate 
via email in the bidding experiment by (1) acting as senior managers for hypothetical 
contractors (labeled A to F) and (2) bidding for a total of 60 construction contracts. These 
were arranged in 10 rounds of 6 contracts so that feedback information could be given to 
the participants at the end of each round.  
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The participants’ responses were arranged in two parts. In Part 1 the six participants were 
invited to submit bids for six contracts where a FPA was used. In Part 2 the six 
participants were invited to submit bids for the same six contracts using a SPA. In 
addition to submitting the bid price in Part 2 the participants were also requested to 
disclose what they thought the second lowest bid price would be. This was done to see if 
each participant’s bid in the FPA was equal to the second lowest bid price in the SPA. 
Identical values indicate that the participant has bid according to their best strategy and in 
accordance with the revenue equivalence theory.  
 
Each participant was given key information about each construction contract such as 
project type, client identity and location. The 60 contracts, based on real Hong Kong 
construction contracts, are from public and private sector clients. Contracts varied 
between HK$1 million and HK$450 million and comprised new build and alteration 
work contracts. Each participant was also given a unique cost estimate which was based 
on the bids contained in the bid reports.  
 
In an attempt to make the experiment more realistic and maintain participant interest over 
10 rounds, profit/ loss was generated for each contract by deducting a randomly assigned 
final cost from the winning bid.  Participants were informed that the contractor’s 
objective was to maximize profit and that the participant who generates the biggest profit 
at the end of 10 rounds would be declared the winner and receive a mystery prize. 
Feedback information given to the participants at the end of each round comprised (1) 
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winning bid, (2) identity of the successful contractor and (3) whether the contract won 
generated a profit or loss.  
 
At the end of the experiment the 60 winning bids from the FPA were averaged and 
compared to the averaged winning bids from the SPA. A t-test was used to determine if 
there is a significant difference between the winning bid values. A significant difference 
between the average winning bids indicates that the revenue equivalence theory does not 
apply and vice versa.  
 
Experiment limitations 
 
Setting up a construction bidding experiment that truly reflects contractors bidding 
behaviour is quite difficult to do since there are so many different variables to consider. 
Flanagan and Norman (1982) state that contractor bidding behaviour, in general, is 
influenced by (1) size and complexity of construction work, (2) regional market 
conditions, (3) current and projected workload of the contractor, (4) type of client, (5) 
type of construction work. This experiment has captured some of the major bidding 
behaviour variables including size and type of construction work, location and client 
identity. The experiment, however, does not consider factors such as changing in market 
conditions or the contractor’s current and projected workload relative to target turnover. 
The participants are told to assume normal market conditions and that the contractor has 
an unlimited contracting capacity (i.e. it is theoretically possible for one contractor to win 
all 60 contracts).  
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It is also recognised that the performance of economic agents tend to deteriorate 
substantially in the laboratory compared to field settings in general (Hogarth, 1981), 
auction markets (eg., Bazerman and Samuelson, 1983; Kagel 1995) and in contract 
bidding (Dyer and Kagel 1996), although it is felt that such experiments do provide 
realistic enough results (eg., Kagel and Dyer, 1996; Smith, 2001:28)  maintain the . 
 
Analysis 
 
The following analysis compares the bid prices of the six participants when competing 
for the same 60 construction contracts using both first price and second price auctions.  
Table 2 shows the number of successes and winning bids of the six contractors for the 
first and second price auctions. It can be seen that in terms of successes Contractors C 
and D are equally tied in winning most FPA while Contractor D won most SPA.  
Contractor B won the least FPA.  Both Contractor B and E won more SPA than FPA. An 
influencing factor is that two contractors reduced their mark ups the most when 
submitting their bids for the SPA. Contractor B’s average mark up reduced from over 
16% to less than 10% while Contractor E’s average mark up is reduced from over 10% to 
less than 8%. Interestingly there was either no difference or the difference was less than 
one percent for mark ups of the remaining four contractors.  
 
The winning bid for the FPA averaged out at HK$64.700 million. This compares to an 
average lowest submitted bid of HK$64.319 million for the SPA. This is adjusted to 
HK$65.607 million when the lowest submitted bid is adjusted to the second lowest price. 
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The results show that clients would therefore on average need to pay an average of 
almost HK$1million per contract more if a SPA was used in place of a FPA. A paired 
samples t-test used to compare winning bid prices of FPA and SPA (i.e. HK$64.700 and 
HK$65.607 million respectively) showed that there is a significant difference between the 
two means (t = -3.469, df = 59, p=0.001). In other words, t-test statistic shows that clients 
would on average expect to pay more if a second price sealed bid auction was used 
instead of a first price sealed bid auction. The results of this experiment suggests that 
Vickery’s revenue equivalence theory is unlikely to occur in practice. This is not 
surprising given that four of the six contractors, on average, submitted almost the same 
bid prices for both the first and second price auctions. Interestingly, out of sixty contracts 
there were a total of 11 contracts where the first and second price winning bids were 
identical, 41 contracts where the second price winning bid was higher than the first price 
bid and only 8 contracts where the first price winning bid was higher than the second 
price winning bid. 
 
Direct comparisons between the first and second price auction winning bids of each 
contractor cannot be made because although a particular contractor may have won the 
first price auction, it may not have won the second price auction and vice versa. The 
following winning bid ratio was therefore used so that direct comparisons could be made 
between contractors: 
 
WBR = 2PWB/1PWB       (1) 
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Where: 
 
WBR = Winning bid ratio 
2PWB = Second price winning bid 
1PWB = First price winning bid 
 
Table 2 shows that, in the five SPA won by Contractor A, the average winning bid ratio 
is 1.057. In other words, for the five SPA by Contractor A, the client would have to pay 
5.7% more than if a FPA was used. For Contractors C, D and F it can be seen that the 
corresponding winning bid ratios are 1.030, 1.043 and 1.031. These four ratios exceeding 
unity is to be expected given that the average bids for the first and second price auctions 
submitted by Contractors A, C, D and F was almost the same. 
 
Interestingly for those two contractors who reduced their mark up between the two 
auction methods the most (i.e. Contractors B and E), the winning bid ratios are 1.000 and 
1.018.  In other words, with respect to the 10 second price auctions won by Contractor B 
the client would, on average, pay the same monetary amount and for Contractor E clients 
would pay on average 1.8% more.   
 
This analysis seems to indicate that the applicability of Vickery’s revenue equivalence 
theory in practice is dependent on the competing bidders’ willingness to submit lower bid 
prices in SPA when compared to corresponding bids submitted in FPA.  
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Conclusions  
 
A bidding experiment is used in this paper to test the applicability of Vickery’s revenue 
equivalence theory in construction auctions. Although experimental results are limited, in 
that they do not fully account for all the real world complexities, they should provide 
useful insights into the relationships between different variables that would not otherwise 
have been revealed or found. In this case the focus is on comparing (1) winning prices of 
FPA (2) winning prices of SPA and (3) estimated winning prices. 
 
T-test results show a significant difference between the winning bid prices of FPA and 
SPA, with the winning bid prices of SPA being significantly higher than FPA. If applied 
in reality, this means that clients would on average pay more if SPA was used instead of 
FPA.  
 
The experiment also shows that the bidders involved do not bid optimally. Auction theory 
predicts that, in descending sealed bid auctions, bidders will assume that theirs is the 
lowest bid, determine their bid and then adjust their bid upwards to the second lowest bid. 
The results show that two of the six participants estimate that the lowest bid price would 
be lower than their submitted bid prices. In such cases there seems to be little point in 
competing since they are forecasting that they are not going to win the competition. Two 
contractors submitted identical bid prices for both the FPA and SPA while the theory 
indicates that the optimal bids in FPA should be higher than those in SPA. 
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The applicability of Vickery’s revenue equivalence theory in practice appears to be 
dependent on the competing bidders’ willingness to submit lower bid prices in second 
price auctions when compared to corresponding bids submitted in the first price auctions. 
For revenue equivalence theory to hold, however, bidders must behave rationally, be risk 
neutral and have independent estimates. It is suggested that future research directions in 
this area include investigating the extent to which contractors (1) bid rationally (2) are at 
least risk neutral and (3) are influenced by the bids of others.  
 
The results show many instances of contractors not bidding in accordance with their best 
bidding strategy as defined by auction theory.  It is suggested that a better understanding 
of auction theory within the construction industry would improve this situation. 
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Rival bid Contractor’s private valuation $11.0 
  Contractor bids $11.0 Contractor bids $10.8 Contractor bids $11.6 
  Profit/Loss Outcome Profit/Loss Outcome Profit/Loss Outcome 
            
$10.6  0 Lose competition: 0 Lose competition: 0 Lose competition:
   no profit / no loss   no profit / no loss  no profit / no loss
            
$10.9  0 Lose competition: -0.1 Win competition: 0 Lose competition:
   no profit / no loss   Loss - 0.1  no profit / no loss
            
$11.3  +0.3 Win competition: +0.3 Win competition: 0 Lose competition:
   Profit +0.3   Profit +0.3  no profit / no loss
              
$11.8  +0.8 Win competition: +0.8 Win competition: +0.8 Win competition:
   Profit +0.8   Profit +0.8  Profit +0.8 
Overall +1.1   +1.0   +0.8   
 
 
Table 1:  Example showing that the best strategy in Vickery auctions is for 
contractors to bid their private valuation  
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 First price auction Second price auction 2p win bid/ Av est. 
Bidder No. of bid Average Win bid No. of bid Average Av. submit Average Av. win bid 1p win bid 2nd lowest
  successes win bid mark-up successes submit bid mark-up win bid mark-up ratio bid 
A 8 104.354 7.248 5 41.512 7.603 41.844 13.759 1.057 41.962 
B 4 24.890 9.827 10 94.065 5.838 94.928 7.926 1.000 97.354 
C 16 65.974 5.753 12 65.792 5.482 67.596 9.216 1.030 65.414 
D 16 70.679 4.381 14 51.362 4.633 52.743 9.122 1.043 51.941 
E 7 19.746 9.133 10 61.649 5.258 62.989 7.987 1.018 62.390 
F 9 69.217 4.166 9 65.097 3.412 66.498 7.119 1.031 65.499 
Overall 60 64.700 6.014 60 64.319 5.172 65.607 9.038 1.028 65.148 
           
Table 2: Successful bidding attempt analysis       .           
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TESTING VICKERY’S REVENUE EQUIVALENCE 
THEORY IN CONSTRUCTION AUCTIONS 
 
Abstract  
 
Construction work is often allocated to contractors via first price sealed bid auctions. 
American Nobel Prize winner and Economist William Vickery, however, has suggested 
that a second price auction (lowest bidder wins the contract at the second lowest price) 
may be more beneficial to those concerned due to the revenue equivalence theory (RET).  
This implies that, upon certain conditions being met, owners can, in the long run, expect 
to pay approximately the same amount to contractors irrespective of whether contracts 
are awarded according to a first price auction (FPA) or second price auction (SPA). At 
the same time, it is expected to be easier to bid in a SPA.  
 
In the absence of any real world data, the likely effects of using SPA for construction 
were examined experimentally.  This involved the participation of a group of experienced 
construction bidders over 60 identical first and second price construction auctions.  
Contrary to expectations, the bids for the second price arrangement were significantly 
higher, indicating that RET is unlikely to occur in practice in construction bidding. In 
other words, the results indicate that construction clients are likely to pay more if second 
price auctioning is used in the construction industry. 
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Vickery. 
Introduction 
 
The best strategy in a first price sealed low bid auction (FPA) (where the bidder 
submitting the lowest bid wins the contract at the value of the lowest bid) is for 
contractors to (1) assume theirs is the lowest bid, (2) determine their bid and (3) then 
adjust the bid upwards to the second lowest bid (Ramusen 1996). However, for 
construction contract auctions, the “compactness” of the bids (Dyer and Kagel 1996) 
makes it virtually impossible to estimate the value of the second lowest bid with 
sufficient accuracy and the problem facing contractors is that increasing their bid too 
little results in lost revenue to the contractor while increasing too much means losing the 
competition.  
 
The second price sealed bid auction (SPA), or Vickery (1961) auction as it is sometimes 
known, attempts to overcome this difficulty by awarding the contract to the lowest bidder 
at the second lowest bid price. Upon certain conditions being met, Vickery has shown  
that contract sellers (i.e. clients) can, in the long run, expect to pay the same amount to 
contract buyers (i.e. contractors) irrespective of whether contracts are awarded to the 
lowest bidder at the lowest bid price or to the lowest bidder at the second lowest bid 
price. This is referred to in auction literature as the revenue equivalence theory. This 
implies that construction clients and contractors would be no worse off financially 
irrespective of whether a FPA or SPA is used.  There is likely to be a psychological 
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difference, however, with contractors feeling they are getting a better deal.  One outcome 
of this could be that contractors will be happier with their lot and less inclined to seek 
ways of extracting more money out of clients by cutting corners and/or claiming extras.  
In other words, a less disputatious industry may result – solving, at a stroke, what has 
been recognised over the years as the biggest problem facing the construction industry 
world-wide (e.g. Simon, 1944; Banwell, 1964; Latham, 1994, in the United Kingdom ;  
Business Round Table, 1994 in the USA and Gyles, 1992 in Australia  ). 
 
Apart from introducing the revenue equivalence theory Vickery argued that using SPA 
would force bidders to be more truthful. This is because the dominant strategy in Vickery 
auctions is for bidders to bid without need to make competition adjustments (i.e. (1) 
assume theirs is the lowest bid and (2) determine their bid only).  Hypothetical examples 
can be used to explain this phenomenon. Suppose a contractor is bidding in four separate 
competitions where the cost estimate for each competition happens to be exactly $10 
million, the minimum mark up margin (including profit) is 10%. The contractor’s private 
valuation becomes $11 million.  A Vickery auction is used. Suppose the lowest rival bid 
in each of the four competitions is $10.6, $10.9, $11.3 and $11.8 million respectively. 
Table 1 shows that if the contractor submits a bid of $11 million the additional profit 
amounts to $1.1 million. If, however, the contractor submits a more competitive bid of 
$10.8 million it can be seen that the profit actually reduces by $100,000 to $1.0 million 
and if the contractor decides to increase its bid to $11.6 million the profit reduces further 
to $0.8million. Therefore the best strategy, in the long run, is for contractors to simply 
determine their bid without having to make the difficult upwards adjustment. 
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Despite the theoretical advantages of being simpler to bid and 
producing truthful bidding competitions TESTING 
VICKERY’S REVENUE EQUIVALENCE THEORY IN 
CONSTRUCTION AUCTIONS 
 
, Vickery auctions are rare.  Rothkopf et al (1990) have suggested two reasons for this. 
First, bidders have a natural reluctatnce to follow the truth revealing strategies just 
described, especially in competitions requiring subsequent negotiations. Second, Vickery 
auctions are not so robust with respect to cheating and the fear of cheating. Apart from 
collusion taking place, which adversely affects all types of auction designs, it is feared 
that some bidders may deliberately bid low to win the competition unfairly. Are 
contractors willing to take such risks in construction, especially on the larger contracts 
which involve huge sums of money? Although contractors may occasionally have some 
degree of success by deliberately bidding low, clearly this is a risky strategy. If more than 
one contractor deliberately bids low then the lowest bidder is likely to end up in financial 
ruin. It would therefore not be unreasonable to assume that, at least for the vast majority 
of contracts, the possibility of more than one contractor deliberately doing this should 
deter all the other contractors from deliberately bidding low. If this assumption is 
accepted, another key consideration is whether construction clients are likely to pay the 
same irrespective of using FPA or SPA. In other words, Does Vickery’s  revenue 
equivalence theory hold? 
 
Bidding experiments in construction 
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The construction bidding process has been simulated in the classroom. For example, 
Lansley (1999) and Harris and McCaffer (1989) have developed software for contractor 
management games. Tthe main purpose of these games, however, is to simulate the 
running of a construction firm as a whole rather than to specifically focus on the bidding 
process and are therefore unable to compare alternative construction bidding designs.  
 
Although these games do have the potential to generate the data needed, so many other 
variables would need to be considered that it would have taken the participants an 
unreasonably long time to bid for 60 first price auctions and second price auctions (the 
number of auctions needed to generate a reasonable data set). Also a classroom 
environment means that participants would have very little time to think about what bid 
level to submit. It was therefore decided to simplify the game format by focusing on a 
methodology that tests applicability of Vickery’s revenue equivalence theory to 
construction auctions by directly comparing FPA and SPA results. 
 
Bidding experiment methodology 
 
Six professionals, with at least 15 years experience of organising and participating in 
bidding competitions in the Hong Kong construction industry, were invited to participate 
via email in the bidding experiment by (1) acting as senior managers for hypothetical 
contractors (labeled A to F) and (2) bidding for a total of 60 construction contracts. These 
were arranged in 10 rounds of 6 contracts so that feedback information could be given to 
the participants at the end of each round.  
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The participants’ responses were arranged in two parts. In Part 1 the six participants were 
invited to submit bids for six contracts where a FPA was used. In Part 2 the six 
participants were invited to submit bids for the same six contracts using a SPA. In 
addition to submitting the bid price in Part 2 the participants were also requested to 
disclose what they thought the second lowest bid price would be. This was done to see if 
each participant’s bid in the FPA was equal to the second lowest bid price in the SPA. 
Identical values indicate that the participant has bid according to their best strategy and in 
accordance with the revenue equivalence theory.  
 
Each participant was given key information about each construction contract such as 
project type, client identity and location. The 60 contracts, based on real Hong Kong 
construction contracts, are from public and private sector clients. Contracts varied 
between HK$1 million and HK$450 million and comprised new build and alteration 
work contracts. Each participant was also given a unique cost estimate which was based 
on the bids contained in the bid reports.  
 
In an attempt to make the experiment more realistic and maintain participant interest over 
10 rounds, profit/ loss was generated for each contract by deducting a randomly assigned 
final cost from the winning bid.  Participants were informed that the contractor’s 
objective was to maximize profit and that the participant who generates the biggest profit 
at the end of 10 rounds would be declared the winner and receive a mystery prize. 
Feedback information given to the participants at the end of each round comprised (1) 
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winning bid, (2) identity of the successful contractor and (3) whether the contract won 
generated a profit or loss.  
 
At the end of the experiment the 60 winning bids from the FPA were averaged and 
compared to the averaged winning bids from the SPA. A t-test was used to determine if 
there is a significant difference between the winning bid values. A significant difference 
between the average winning bids indicates that the revenue equivalence theory does not 
apply and vice versa.  
 
Experiment limitations 
 
Setting up a construction bidding experiment that truly reflects contractors bidding 
behaviour is quite difficult to do since there are so many different variables to consider. 
Flanagan and Norman (1982) state that contractor bidding behaviour, in general, is 
influenced by (1) size and complexity of construction work, (2) regional market 
conditions, (3) current and projected workload of the contractor, (4) type of client, (5) 
type of construction work. This experiment has captured some of the major bidding 
behaviour variables including size and type of construction work, location and client 
identity. The experiment, however, does not consider factors such as changing in market 
conditions or the contractor’s current and projected workload relative to target turnover. 
The participants are told to assume normal market conditions and that the contractor has 
an unlimited contracting capacity (i.e. it is theoretically possible for one contractor to win 
all 60 contracts).  
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It is also recognised that the performance of economic agents tend to deteriorate 
substantially in the laboratory compared to field settings in general (Hogarth, 1981), 
auction markets (eg., Bazerman and Samuelson, 1983; Kagel 1995) and in contract 
bidding (Dyer and Kagel 1996), although it is felt that such experiments do provide 
realistic enough results (eg., Kagel and Dyer, 1996; Smith, 2001:28)  maintain the . 
 
Analysis 
 
The following analysis compares the bid prices of the six participants when competing 
for the same 60 construction contracts using both first price and second price auctions.  
Table 2 shows the number of successes and winning bids of the six contractors for the 
first and second price auctions. It can be seen that in terms of successes Contractors C 
and D are equally tied in winning most FPA while Contractor D won most SPA.  
Contractor B won the least FPA.  Both Contractor B and E won more SPA than FPA. An 
influencing factor is that two contractors reduced their mark ups the most when 
submitting their bids for the SPA. Contractor B’s average mark up reduced from over 
16% to less than 10% while Contractor E’s average mark up is reduced from over 10% to 
less than 8%. Interestingly there was either no difference or the difference was less than 
one percent for mark ups of the remaining four contractors.  
 
The winning bid for the FPA averaged out at HK$64.700 million. This compares to an 
average lowest submitted bid of HK$64.319 million for the SPA. This is adjusted to 
HK$65.607 million when the lowest submitted bid is adjusted to the second lowest price. 
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The results show that clients would therefore on average need to pay an average of 
almost HK$1million per contract more if a SPA was used in place of a FPA. A paired 
samples t-test used to compare winning bid prices of FPA and SPA (i.e. HK$64.700 and 
HK$65.607 million respectively) showed that there is a significant difference between the 
two means (t = -3.469, df = 59, p=0.001). In other words, t-test statistic shows that clients 
would on average expect to pay more if a second price sealed bid auction was used 
instead of a first price sealed bid auction. The results of this experiment suggests that 
Vickery’s revenue equivalence theory is unlikely to occur in practice. This is not 
surprising given that four of the six contractors, on average, submitted almost the same 
bid prices for both the first and second price auctions. Interestingly, out of sixty contracts 
there were a total of 11 contracts where the first and second price winning bids were 
identical, 41 contracts where the second price winning bid was higher than the first price 
bid and only 8 contracts where the first price winning bid was higher than the second 
price winning bid. 
 
Direct comparisons between the first and second price auction winning bids of each 
contractor cannot be made because although a particular contractor may have won the 
first price auction, it may not have won the second price auction and vice versa. The 
following winning bid ratio was therefore used so that direct comparisons could be made 
between contractors: 
 
WBR = 2PWB/1PWB       (1) 
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Where: 
 
WBR = Winning bid ratio 
2PWB = Second price winning bid 
1PWB = First price winning bid 
 
Table 2 shows that, in the five SPA won by Contractor A, the average winning bid ratio 
is 1.057. In other words, for the five SPA by Contractor A, the client would have to pay 
5.7% more than if a FPA was used. For Contractors C, D and F it can be seen that the 
corresponding winning bid ratios are 1.030, 1.043 and 1.031. These four ratios exceeding 
unity is to be expected given that the average bids for the first and second price auctions 
submitted by Contractors A, C, D and F was almost the same. 
 
Interestingly for those two contractors who reduced their mark up between the two 
auction methods the most (i.e. Contractors B and E), the winning bid ratios are 1.000 and 
1.018.  In other words, with respect to the 10 second price auctions won by Contractor B 
the client would, on average, pay the same monetary amount and for Contractor E clients 
would pay on average 1.8% more.   
 
This analysis seems to indicate that the applicability of Vickery’s revenue equivalence 
theory in practice is dependent on the competing bidders’ willingness to submit lower bid 
prices in SPA when compared to corresponding bids submitted in FPA.  
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Conclusions  
 
A bidding experiment is used in this paper to test the applicability of Vickery’s revenue 
equivalence theory in construction auctions. Although experimental results are limited, in 
that they do not fully account for all the real world complexities, they should provide 
useful insights into the relationships between different variables that would not otherwise 
have been revealed or found. In this case the focus is on comparing (1) winning prices of 
FPA (2) winning prices of SPA and (3) estimated winning prices. 
 
T-test results show a significant difference between the winning bid prices of FPA and 
SPA, with the winning bid prices of SPA being significantly higher than FPA. If applied 
in reality, this means that clients would on average pay more if SPA was used instead of 
FPA.  
 
The experiment also shows that the bidders involved do not bid optimally. Auction theory 
predicts that, in descending sealed bid auctions, bidders will assume that theirs is the 
lowest bid, determine their bid and then adjust their bid upwards to the second lowest bid. 
The results show that two of the six participants estimate that the lowest bid price would 
be lower than their submitted bid prices. In such cases there seems to be little point in 
competing since they are forecasting that they are not going to win the competition. Two 
contractors submitted identical bid prices for both the FPA and SPA while the theory 
indicates that the optimal bids in FPA should be higher than those in SPA. 
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The applicability of Vickery’s revenue equivalence theory in practice appears to be 
dependent on the competing bidders’ willingness to submit lower bid prices in second 
price auctions when compared to corresponding bids submitted in the first price auctions. 
For revenue equivalence theory to hold, however, bidders must behave rationally, be risk 
neutral and have independent estimates. It is suggested that future research directions in 
this area include investigating the extent to which contractors (1) bid rationally (2) are at 
least risk neutral and (3) are influenced by the bids of others.  
 
The results show many instances of contractors not bidding in accordance with their best 
bidding strategy as defined by auction theory.  It is suggested that a better understanding 
of auction theory within the construction industry would improve this situation. 
 
Acknowledgement 
 
This research is supported by the Research Grants Council, University Grants Committee 
of  Hong Kong, through Grant PolyU 5004/99E 
 
References 
 
Banwell Report, (1964) The placing and management of contracts for building and civil 
engineering works, Ministry of Building and Works, London: HMSO. 
 
Bazerman, M. H. and W.F. Samuelson (1983) I won the auction but I don’t want the 
prize, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 27 618-634 
 13
 
Business Round Table (1994) Controlling the upwards spiral: construction performance 
and cost in the UK and mainland Europe, The Business Round Table, London. 
 
Dyer, D. and Kagel, J.H. (1996) Bidding in common value auctions: how the commercial 
construction industry corrects for the winners curse, Management Science, 42 1463-75   
 
Flanagan, R. and Norman, G. (1982) Making good use of low bids, Chartered Quantity 
Surveyor, March, 226-227 
 
Gyles, R.V. (1992) Royal Commission into productivity in the building industry in New 
South Wales, Government of New South Wales, Sydney 
 
Harris F. and McCaffer R. (1989) Modern construction management, BSP Professional 
Books, Oxford 
 
Hogarth, R.M. (1981) Beyond discrete biases: functional and dysfunctional aspects of 
judgmental heuristics, Psychology Bulletin, 90 197-217 
 
 
Kagel, J.H. (1995) Auctions: a survey of experimental research, in J.H. Kagel and A.E. 
Roth (Eds.) The handbook of experimental economics, Princeton University Press, New 
Jersey 
 14
 
Lansley P. (1999) AROUSAL VII - AROUSAL for Windows, Management Reality 
 
Latham, M. (1994) Constructing the team, Final Report of The Government/Industry 
Review of Procurement and Contractual Arrangements in The UK Construction Industry, 
HMSO, London, July 
 
Ramusen, E. (1996) Games and information, Blackwell, Cambridge, Mass. 
 
Rothkopf, M.H., Teisberg T.J. and Kahn, E.P. (1990) Why are Vickery auctions rare? 
Journal of Political Economy, 98 (1) 94 - 109  
 
Simon (1944) The placing and management of building contracts, Central Council for 
Works and Buildings, HMSO, London 
 
Smith, V.L.  2001.  Method in experiment: rhetoric and reality.  Interdisciplinary Centre for 
Economic Science, George Mason University, July. 
 
Vickery, W. (1961) Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders, Journal 
of Finance, 16 (1) 8-37 
 15
 
 
Rival bid Contractor’s private valuation $11.0 
  Contractor bids $11.0 Contractor bids $10.8 Contractor bids $11.6 
  Profit/Loss Outcome Profit/Loss Outcome Profit/Loss Outcome 
            
$10.6  0 Lose competition: 0 Lose competition: 0 Lose competition:
   no profit / no loss   no profit / no loss  no profit / no loss
            
$10.9  0 Lose competition: -0.1 Win competition: 0 Lose competition:
   no profit / no loss   Loss - 0.1  no profit / no loss
            
$11.3  +0.3 Win competition: +0.3 Win competition: 0 Lose competition:
   Profit +0.3   Profit +0.3  no profit / no loss
              
$11.8  +0.8 Win competition: +0.8 Win competition: +0.8 Win competition:
   Profit +0.8   Profit +0.8  Profit +0.8 
Overall +1.1   +1.0   +0.8   
 
 
Table 1:  Example showing that the best strategy in Vickery auctions is for 
contractors to bid their private valuation  
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 First price auction Second price auction 2p win bid/ Av est. 
Bidder No. of bid Average Win bid No. of bid Average Av. submit Average Av. win bid 1p win bid 2nd lowest
  successes win bid mark-up successes submit bid mark-up win bid mark-up ratio bid 
A 8 104.354 7.248 5 41.512 7.603 41.844 13.759 1.057 41.962 
B 4 24.890 9.827 10 94.065 5.838 94.928 7.926 1.000 97.354 
C 16 65.974 5.753 12 65.792 5.482 67.596 9.216 1.030 65.414 
D 16 70.679 4.381 14 51.362 4.633 52.743 9.122 1.043 51.941 
E 7 19.746 9.133 10 61.649 5.258 62.989 7.987 1.018 62.390 
F 9 69.217 4.166 9 65.097 3.412 66.498 7.119 1.031 65.499 
Overall 60 64.700 6.014 60 64.319 5.172 65.607 9.038 1.028 65.148 
           
Table 2: Successful bidding attempt analysis       .           
 
 
